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S E N T E N C I N G
Cooperating with the Prosecutor: How Many Motions
Does It Take to Secure a Sentence That Is Less Than
the Mandatory Minimum Provided By Statute?
by Jimmy Gurule
The sentence of a person
convicted of a federal
crime is determined
under federal statutes and
under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines
and these two sentences
can be different. Federal
law also provides for sen-
tences below the mini-
mum sentences imposed
by statute or under the
Guidelines for substantial
cooperation with the
prosecution. At issue in
this case is whether or
not a motion to impose a
sentence below the
Guidelines minimum
sentence also acts as a
motion to impose a sen-
tence below the statutory
minimum sentence.
)
1
In enacting the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§
3551-3559 and 3742 and 28 U.S.C.
§§ 991-998 (1988), Congress
W1 dramatically reformed sentencing in
the federal criminal justice system
by explicitly rejecting the existing
use of indeterminate sentencing in
favor of a mandatory guideline
°.< ; system of sentencing. "Under the
indeterminate sentencing system,
C Congress defined the maximum sen-
tence, the judge imposed sentence
within the statutory range (which
€, usually could be replaced with pro-
, , bation), and the Executive Branch's
parole official eventually determined
, the actual duration of imprison-
ment." Mistretta v. United States,
). 488 U.S. 361, 365 (1989).
In effect, under indeterminate
. sentencing, federal criminal statutes
specified a wide range of penalties
9 ';, but delegated to the sentencing
judge almost unfettered discretion to
*e- decide the appropriate sentence to
be imposed. Moreover, with the
advent of parole, corrections person-
nel of the Executive Branch were
1 "4 granted the discretion to release a
prisoner prior to the expiration of
the sentence imposed. Thus, in the
federal government's indeterminate
sentencing scheme, the actual
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sentence served was not necessarily
the sentence imposed by the
sentencing judge.
Over time, indeterminate sentencing
came in for harsh criticism. "Serious
disparities in sentences ... were
common." Mistretta, 488 U.S. at
365-66. Similarly situated defen-
dants convicted of engaging in the
same criminal conduct were sen-
tenced to disparate, unwarranted
sentences. "Fundamental and wide-
spread dissatisfaction with the
uncertainties and disparities [in sen-
tencing] continued to be expressed."
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 366.
To remedy these concerns,
Congress, as part of the Sentencing
Reform Act, created the United
States Sentencing Commission
(the "Sentencing Commission" or
the "Commission"). 28 U.S.C. §§
991-998. The Commission was
instructed by Congress to promul-
gate a series of guidelines - now
known as the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines (the "Sentencing
Guidelines" or the "Guidelines") -
to establish a sentencing scheme
that would "provide certainty and
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fairness in meeting the purposes of
sentencing, avoiding unwarranted
sentence disparities among defen-
dants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar criminal
conduct while maintaining sufficient
flexibility to permit individualized
sentences when warranted.
28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B).
The Commission's mandatory
Sentencing Guidelines were intend-
ed to establish a range of determi-
nate sentences for categories of
offenses and offenders according to
various specified factors. Perhaps
most important in the shift from
indeterminate to determinate sen-
tencing, the Sentencing Guidelines
significantly curtailed the previously
unfettered discretion of federal
district court judges in sentencing
offenders by providing that the
maximum range of the sentence to
be imposed ordinarily may not
exceed the minimum by more than
25 percent, or six months, whichev-
er is greater. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2).
Significantly, Congress authorized
a downward departure from the
applicable sentencing range set out
in the Sentencing Guidelines "on
motion of the Government stating
that the defendant has provided
substantial assistance in the investi-
gation or prosecution of another
person who has committed an
offense." See 28 U.S.C. § 994(n);
Sentencing Guidelines § 5K1.1.
Further, Congress provided that on
the Government's motion, a court
may impose a sentence below the
mandatory minimum term set by
statute to reflect the defendant's
"substantial assistance in the investi-
gation or prosecution of another
person who committed an offense."
18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). It is this down-
ward departure sentencing authority
- the judicial authority to impose a
sentence less than the Guidelines
and less than the statutorily pre-
scribed minimum sentences -
based on an offender's substantial
assistance that is at issue in this case.
ISSUE
Once a federal prosecutor asks for a
downward departure in sentencing
in recognition of an offender's sub-
stantial assistance to law enforce-
ment, does the sentencing judge
have authority to impose a sentence
that is less than both the statutory
minimum sentence and the mini-
mum sentence prescribed in the
Sentencing Guidelines, even when
the Government seeks only a
downward departure from the
Guidelines sentence?
FACTS
Juan Melendez was charged with
possession and conspiracy in con-
nection with the sale and distribu-
tion of more than five kilograms of
cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§
841(a) and 846. Upon conviction,
the statutorily prescribed minimum
prison sentence is 10 years.
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (1988 &
Supp. VII 1995).
The charges against Melendez
stemmed from his participation in a
conspiracy to purchase 225 kilo-
grams of cocaine from confidential
informants of the United States
Customs Service. The drug conspir-
acy was cut short, however, when
Government agents made a
controlled delivery of 30 kilograms
of cocaine and arrested Melendez's
co-conspirators.
Melendez originally pleaded not
guilty. However, plea negotiations
ensued and he signed a cooperating
plea agreement. The agreement pro-
vided that in return for a guilty plea
and Melendez's cooperation with the
Government's investigation of the
conspiracy, the Government would
seek a downward departure from the
applicable sentence under the
Sentencing Guidelines. The plea
agreement did not make reference
to any downward departure with
respect to the statutory mandatory
minimum sentence of 10 years'
imprisonment.
In the routine presentence report
for Melendez, the federal probation
officer determined that the applica-
ble sentencing range under the
Sentencing Guidelines was 135 to
168 months' imprisonment. The
Government, in accordance with
the plea agreement, asked the
sentencing judge for a downward
departure from the Guidelines
range in recognition of Melendez's
substantial assistance.
The judge granted the Government's
request with respect to the
Sentencing Guidelines. However,
because the Government had not
sought a downward departure from
the statutory 10-year mandatory
minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A), the judge ruled that
he had no authority to depart from
that minimum. Accordingly, the
judge sentenced Melendez to 10
years' imprisonment or 120 months'.
Melendez appealed to the Third
Circuit which affirmed by a two-to-
one vote. 55 F.3d 130 (3d Cir.
1995). In so holding, the majority
rejected Melendez's contention that
the Government's motion to
depart from the sentencing range
prescribed by the Sentencing
Guidelines also permits the sen-
tencing judge to impose a sentence
below the statutory mandatory min-
imum. In rejecting this argument,
the Third Circuit majority held that
a motion for downward departure
for purposes of the Sentencing
Guidelines unaccompanied by a
similar motion for purposes of 18
U.S.C. § 3553(e) "does not autho-
rize a sentencing court to impose a
sentence lower that the statutory
minimum." 55 F3d at 136.
(Continued on Page 243)
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The Third Circuit majority reasoned
that Congress authorized sentences
below the statutory mandatory
minimum only on a prosecutor's
motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e).
In requiring a motion by the federal
prosecutor, the majority concluded
that "Congress gave the prosecutor
the sole key that affords access to a
sentence below a statutory mini-
mum." 55 F.3d at 134. In the majori-
ty's view, Congress intended that the
prosecutor, not the sentencing court,
evaluate the offender's cooperation
and whether or not it warranted
overriding Congress' judgment
concerning the appropriate mini-
mum sentence for the offender's
criminal conduct.
The Third Circuit majority went on
to observe that Section 5K1.1 of the
Sentencing Guidelines which autho-
rizes downward departures in sen-
tencing applies only to a sentence
imposed below the Guidelines range,
not to one below the statutory
mandatory minimum. According, to
the majority, nothing in Section
5K1.1 suggests that a judge's down-
ward departure authority extends
beyond the Guidelines to the
mandatory minimum sentence
imposed by a congressional statute.
The Third Circuit majority charac-
terized the root issue as "whether
the prosecutor in a given case will be
able to grant access to a Guideline
departure for cooperation and at the
same time retain control of access to
a departure from a lower, statutory
minimum." 55 F.3d at 135. The
majority opined that the literal lan-
guage of Section 5K1.1 indicates that
a prosecutor has this option, an
option that, in the view of the Third
Circuit majority, is supported by
sound policy reasons. Here, the
majority observed that the process
for departing downward based on
the offender's substantial assistance
works best if the amount of the
reward can be graduated to reflect
the value of the offender's assis-
tance. Such calibration is best left to
the prosecutor who is in a better
position than the sentencing judge
to make this assessment.
The Supreme Court now reviews
the decision of the Third Circuit
majority, having granted Melendez's
petition for a writ of certiorari.
116 S. Ct. 417 (1995).
CASE ANALYSIS
This case is about the interrelation-
ship, if any, between a federal
sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C. §
3553(e), and a provision of the
Sentencing Guidelines, § 5K1.1. The
sentencing statute provides that, on
motion of the United States, the sen-
tencing court "shall have the author-
ity to impose a sentence below a
level established by statute as a
minimum sentence so as to reflect a
defendant's substantial assistance in
the investigation or prosecution of
another person who has committed
an offense." The Guidelines provide
that, on motion of the United States
"stating that the defendant has
provided substantial assistance in
the investigation or prosecution of
another person who committed an
offense," the sentencing judge may
depart from the range prescribed by
the Sentencing Guidelines.
Melendez maintains that Congress
intended a unitary approach to down-
ward departures based on an offend-
er's substantial assistance. Thus, he
argues that a single Government
motion acknowledging an offender's
substantial assistance is enough to
authorize a downward departure with
respect to both the statutory mandato-
ry minimum sentence and the
Guidelines sentencing range. According
to Melendez, it is not necessary for the
Government to file a motion under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(e) in order for the judge
to depart from the statutory minimum
sentence of 10 years' imprisonment; it
is enough that, as in his case, the
Government filed a motion under
Guidelines Section 5K1.1.
Melendez supports his argument by
citing language from the Sentencing
Reform Act establishing the
Sentencing Commission. Congress
expressly directed the Commission
to ensure that the Sentencing
Guidelines would allow sentences
"lower than established by statute as
a minimum sentence to take into
account a defendant's substantial
assistance in the investigation or
prosecution of another person
who has committed an offense."
28 U.S.C. § 994(n).
Melendez stresses that the above-
quoted provision references 18
U.S.C. § 3553 and uses much the
same language as the latter provision
and, accordingly, they should be
applied together and in consonance.
For example, Melendez points out
that both provisions contain refer-
ence to a defendant's substantial
assistance and both define substan-
tial assistance in terms of "investi-
gating or prosecuting another person
who has committed an offense."
Moreover, this precise language
is tracked by the language of
Guidelines Section 5K1.1.
Melendez reasons that the use of
identical language and identical
standards provides strong evidence
that Congress envisioned a unitary
structure for downward departures
below both the statutory mandatory
minimum sentence and the applica-
ble Guidelines range in recognition of
an offender's substantial assistance.
Moreover, Congress delegated to the
Commission the responsibility to
create a mechanism to implement
downward sentencing departures
from statutory mandatory minimum
sentences and the Commission
responded by drafting and imple-
menting Section SK1.1. According to
Melendez, Guidelines Section SK1.1
is the conduit created by the
Commission for implementing the
authority Congress granted to feder-
al district judges under 18 U.S.C. §
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3553(e) to depart from congression-
ally established mandatory mini-
mum sentences.
Melendez's arguments are not
without some force. At least four
federal circuit courts of appeals have
adopted the position advanced by
Melendez. United States v. Ah-Kai,
951 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1991); United
States v. Beckett, 996 F.2d 70 (5th
Cir. 1993); United States v. Wills,
35 F.3d 1192 (7th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Keene, 933 F.2d 711
(9th Cir. 1991).
The Government, however, has the
Third Circuit and the Eighth Circuit,
United States v. Rodriguez-Morales,
958 F.2d 1141 (8th Cir. 1992), in its
camp when it argues that the plain
language of Guidelines Section
5K1.1 does not support Melendez. In
particular, Section 5K1.1 authorizes
a downward departure only from the
sentencing range prescribed by the
Guidelines; nowhere is there any
reference to a downward departure
from mandatory minimum sen-
tences imposed by statute.
From the Government's perspective
the only judicial authority for impos-
ing a sentence below the statutory
mandatory minimum is the authori-
ty set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)
and that authority is triggered by
a motion from the prosecutor.
Since no such motion was filed in
this case, the sentencing judge
correctly ruled that he could not
impose a sentence that was less
than the 10-year mandatory
minimum provided by 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A).
The Government counters
Melendez's contention that
Guidelines Section 5K1.1 imple-
ments 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) by point-
ing out that the Commission's com-
mentary to Section 5K1.1 recognizes
that a downward departure from a
statutory mandatory minimum sen-
tence may be justified "under
circumstances set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(e) and 28 U.S.C. § 994(n)."
According to the Government, one
of those circumstances, as set forth
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), is a motion
of the prosecutor. In the absence of
such a motion by the Government's
prosecutor, as in this case, there is
simply no authority for a federal
judge to sentence even a cooperating
offender to a sentence below the
statutory mandatory minimum.
The difficulty with the Government's
position is that if Congress through
28 U.S.C. § 994(n) directed the
Commission to create a mechanism
to implement downward departures
in sentencing authorized by 18
U.S.C. § 3553(e) and if Guidelines
Section 5K1.1 is not that mecha-
nism, then the Commission has not
complied with Congress' express
mandate. This, however, is highly
unlikely considering that the
Guidelines became effective in 1987.
SIGNIFICANCE
A substantial split in the federal
courts of appeals exists, as noted
above, regarding whether or not the
district court has authority to
sentence an offender who has given
the Government substantial crime-
fighting assistance to a prison term
below the statutory mandatory
minimum when the Government
files a downward departure motion
from the Guidelines range but not
from the statutory minimum sen-
tence. Resolving this conflict is
critical to ensuring that the Guide-
lines are applied in a fair and
evenhanded manner.
Recall that the intent of Congress in
enacting the Sentencing Guidelines
as part of the Sentencing Reform Act
was to reduce sentencing disparities.
Similarly situated offenders who
commit the same criminal offense
should be sentenced similarly. This
purported hallmark of the
Sentencing Guidelines would be
seriously eroded if an offender
before one federal judge is sen-
tenced below the statutory manda-
tory minimum sentence based on
the mere filing of a substantial
assistance motion under Guidelines
Section 5K1.1, while an offender
before another federal judge is sen-
tenced to the statutory mandatory
minimum sentence because the
prosecutor may have filed a Section
5K1.1 motion but did not file a
motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)
expressly asking for a sentence
below the statutory minimum. It is
anticipated that the Supreme
Court's decision will resolve this
dilemma.
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For Juan Melendez (Patrick A.
Mullin; (201) 487-9282).
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